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demonstrates that it is possible to recover the time-0 equilibrium outcome in a 
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In this paper, we explore whether cross-border ﬁnancial markets can create endogenously
good collateral when it is urgently needed in a crisis. In particular, we investigate
which kind of policy interventions in ﬁnancial markets at crisis periods would trigger
the creation of good collateral, and yield eﬃcient outcomes with bilateral borrowing and
lending between countries.
Employing a simple two-country exchange economy setup, we ﬁrst investigate how
country-speciﬁc catastrophic shocks are shared between countries in the time-0 complete
markets with solvency constraints. We then examine whether the time-0 equilibrium
outcome can be recovered in a sequential setup where the transactions of Lucas trees
and contingent claims are subject to collateral constraints. If it is impossible, then we
analyze which kind of interventions in ﬁnancial markets is required to recover the time-0
constrained eﬃcient outcome in a sequential setup.
As discussed intensively in the literature, the setup of time-0 complete markets is
extremely unrealistic, because it is hard to imagine that every ﬁnancial contract is made
ex ante when an economy starts in time 0. Thus, it is important to demonstrate that
the time-0 equilibrium outcome can be achieved successfully in a sequential manner.
Without any constraint or friction, it is quite possible to recover the time-0 complete
markets outcome in dynamically complete markets. However, it may not be a case in
the presence of some enforcement constraints. Nevertheless, most of the existing papers,
including Kehoe and Perri (2002), Lustig and Nieuwerburgh (2005), Lustig (2007), and
Chien and Lustig (2010), present only the time-0 complete markets outcome without
any consideration of recovering the outcome in more realistic environment such as a
sequential setup.1
This paper attempts to demonstrate the relevance of the time-0 constrained eﬃcient
outcome by specifying some conditions under which the time-0 equilibrium outcome
may be recovered in a sequential manner. Following Lustig (2007), we construct a two-
country exchange economy with solvency constraints. A solvency constraint requires
1Following Kehoe and Perri (1993), Alvarez and Jermann (2000) develop a sequential setup without
having any long-lived asset. Kehoe and Perri (2004) decentralize constrained eﬃcient allocations that
arise from enforcement constraints.
1that a net ﬁnancial position should be non-negative at any state in any point of time; it
is assumed that even current labor endowment of a debtor cannot be conﬁscated upon
default. Here, we introduce a country-speciﬁc catastrophic shock such that solvency
constraints may be severely binding.
One of the most substantial diﬀerence between a time-0 setup and a sequential setup
is that a solvency constraint is much more stringent in the latter. In this paper, a
solvency constraint in a sequential setup is called a collateral constraint. Given this
stringent enforcement constraint, any one-period borrowing contracts and short positions
in Lucas trees need to be backed by one-period contingent bonds or long positions in
Lucas trees as collateral assets. Thus, it may be impossible for a damaged country to
cover uninsured catastrophic losses by making only one-period ﬁnancial contracts and
Lucas trees without violating collateral constraints.
However, when pricing errors occur randomly in evaluating Lucas trees during a
catastrophic event, it is possible to recover the time-0 equilibrium outcome in a sequential
manner. More concretely, depending on the sign of pricing errors, either Lucas trees or
contingent bonds are relatively risky in equilibrium. In addition, thanks to pricing
errors, there emerge richness in risky bonds and cheapness in safe bonds. Then, a
damaged country makes short positions in rich risky bonds and long positions in cheap
safe bonds, thereby exploiting arbitrage proﬁts. At the same time, a damaged country
can satisfy collateral constraints, because long positions in safe bonds serves as collateral
assets. Even a nondamaged country beneﬁts from the above ﬁnancial transactions with
damaged country, because it can obtain an investment opportunity to smooth temporary
relative gains over time.
In this way, the bilateral lending and borrowing in a sequential setup work to recover
the time-0 constrained eﬃcient outcome with random pricing errors associated with
Lucas trees. We attempt to interpret realistically the above stochastic component as
a sort of policy interventions, possibly initiated by a central bank. With such proper
interpretations of the pricing error, we could consider the constrained eﬃcient outcome
delivered by the time-0 equilibrium as a reasonable and realistic equilibrium even when
solvency constraints are severely binding.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents both a time-0 setup with
2solvency constraints and a sequential setup with collateral constraints, while Section 3
presents the calibration results. Section 4 oﬀers concluding comments.
2 Model
Following the framework proposed by Kehoe and Perri (2002), Lustig (2007), and Chien
and Lustig (2010), we construct a two-country exchange economy with solvency con-
straints ﬁrst in a time-0 setup, and then put it in the context of a sequential setup with
collateral constraints.
The labor endowment of each country is subject to country-speciﬁc catastrophic
shocks on the level of the labor endowment. On the other hand, dividends on Lucas
trees are proportional to the world endowment. In terms of market structures, markets
are complete with respect to country-speciﬁc catastrophic shocks.
However, each country is subject to solvency constraints in the sense that net ﬁ-
nancial positions cannot be negative in every possible future state. This constraint is
motivated by the fact that it is diﬃcult for even current labor endowment of a debtor
to be conﬁscated upon default.
2.1 Time-0 complete markets with solvency constraints
2.1.1 Labor endowment and Lucas trees
A world economy consists of inﬁnite-horizon exchange economies of country i (i = 1 or 2)
in a discrete time setup. It is assumed that the labor endowment is homogeneous within
each country, but heterogeneous between the two countries. Each country receives labor
endowments subject to country-speciﬁc catastrophic shocks. There is a ﬁxed supply of
Lucas trees whose dividends are subject to world common shocks. The quantity of Lucas
trees is standardized to one.
A set of states of country-speciﬁc labor endowment is deﬁned as y ∈ Y = {y1,...,ym},
while a set of states of dividends on Lucas trees is denoted as z ∈ Z = {z1,...,zn}. A
combination of country-speciﬁc and world common states is expressed by st = (yt,zt),
where st is in S = Y × Z. In addition, st = (yt,zt) denotes a history from time 0 up to
time t, while sj ≽ st represents a continuation history from st.
3Furthermore, we assume that the dividend on Lucas trees d(z) is proportional to
the total labor endowment (e1(y)+e2(y)). Therefore, a combination of country-speciﬁc
shocks constitutes aggregate states. Hereafter, ei(yt) denotes the labor endowment of
country i, and d(zt) denotes the dividend on Lucas trees. The transition probability of
the above state variables π(y′,z′|y,z) evolves according to the following Markov process:
π(z′|z) =
∑
y′∈Y π(y′,z′|y,z), ∀z ∈ Z, ∀y ∈ Y. Given the above processes of labor en-
dowment and dividends, optimal policy functions of consumption and portfolios depend
on state zt.
2.1.2 Preferences and resource constraints















, i ∈ {1,2},







1−γ , γ denotes the degree of relative risk aversion, and β represents the
rate of time preference.
The resource constraint of the world economy is given by:
e(zt) = e1(yt) + e2(yt) + d(zt).





2.1.3 Time-0 complete markets with solvency constraints
In this economy with time-0 complete markets, both the shares of Lucas trees and one
period contingent claims are traded between the two countries. θi(st) denotes the share
of Lucas trees held by country i in time t, while ai(s0,st+1) represents the time-0 holding
of claims on one unit of goods at state st ∈ St, and p(zt) is the price of Lucas trees,.
4The market clearing conditions hold as follows:
θ1(st) + θ2(st) = 1, (1)
a1(s0,st) + a2(s0,st) = 0, for all st ∈ St. (2)
As mentioned above, even current labor endowment of a debtor cannot be conﬁscated
upon default. Therefore, the net position of ﬁnancial assets cannot be negative at any




θi(st−1) ≥ −ai(s0,st), ∀st ∈ St. (3)
We call the above enforcement constraint a solvency constraint.
2.2 Construction of a representative agent model with time-varying
Negishi weights
2.2.1 Time-0 cost minimization problem
Following Lustig (2007), we thus construct a representative agent model with time-
varying Negishi weights (Negishi, 1960) in time-0 setup, and compute the constrained
competitive equilibrium using stochastic discount factors derivable from the representa-
tive agent model. For this end, we convert the time-0 utility maximization problem to
its dual problem or the time-0 cost minimization problem together with a single promise-
keeping constraint, and the solvency constraints, both of which are deﬁned below.
The construction of the time-0 cost minimization problem greatly simpliﬁes the com-
putation procedure of the constrained equilibrium for the following reasons. First, the
value function represented by a promise-keeping constraint can summarize a history
of the realized states, and serve as a state variable; consequently, the space of state
variables is reduced substantially. Second, Negishi weights can be computed from the
cumulation of the Lagrange multipliers associated with solvency constraints. Because
the Lagrange multiplier is positive at a default state and zero otherwise, Negishi weights
become time-varying depending on whether solvency constraints are binding.












0 is the initial endowment, q
(
st−1,st)
corresponds to a stochastic discount factor










Given equation (4), we reformulate a solvency constraint (3) as follows. If equation
(3) is binding and the net ﬁnancial asset is zero upon default at state st, then consump-
tion from state st on has to be ﬁnanced by only the current and future labor endowment.



























Employing the above life-time budget constraint and solvency constraints, we can


































Q(st,sj)ei (yj), ∀st ∈ St, t ≥ 0.
If a country is in default at a certain state, then the last constraint (solvency constraint)
is binding.
The dual problem to the above time-0 problem, that is, the cost minimization prob-
6lem to attain lifetime utility vi
0 in time 0, is characterized as follows:





























Q(st,sj)ei (yj), ∀st ∈ St, t ≥ 0. (7)
The second equation is called a promise-keeping constraint in the sense that the
optimal solution allows a consumer to attain at least lifetime utility vi
0. As mentioned
before, vi
0 can summarize the history of realized states, and economize the space of state
variables.
2.2.2 Time-varying Negishi weights
In the above cost minimization problem, the Lagrange multiplier µi
0 is assigned to the
promise-keeping condition (6), while the multipliers τi(st) are associated with the sol-
vency constraints (7) state by state. The multiplier τi(st) may be either zero or positive
depending on whether a solvency constraint is binding. Using these multipliers, we
rewrite the cost minimization problem (5) as:
Ci (s0) = inf
{ci}

   


































   
   
.
Exploiting a technique presented by Marcet and Marimon (1999),2 we deﬁne the
cumulative multiplier χi(st) as χi(st) ≡ χi(st−1) − τi(st) given χi
−1 = 1,3 and further
rewrite the above cost minimization problem as:
































2Marcet and Marimon (1992) use the same technique. Messner and Pavoni (2004) presented some
cases in which Marcet and Marimon (1999) may not work.












































In a representative agent framework (a planner’s problem), Negishi weights are as-
signed to each lifetime utility, and correspond to the ratio of period marginal utility
between the two agents (countries in our context). Thus, as equation (8) implies, ζ1(st)
and ζ2(st) can be used as Negishi weights. As Lustig (2007) demonstrates, the time-0










































h(st) corresponds to the consumption share of each country.
Without any solvency constraint, Negishi weights are constant over time. Accord-
ingly, the cross-country consumption share does not change over time at all. With
solvency constraints, however, the consumption share between the two countries may
ﬂuctuate. The Negishi weight ζi(st) is constant unless country i is in default at state st,
but otherwise, it is revised upward as a result of positive τi(st) (the multiplier associ-
ated with a solvency constraint). Therefore, the consumption share of country i increases
when country i is in default at state st. One country subject to a solvency constraint
at state st cannot transfer resources from state st to any state which is realized earlier.
Consequently, the consumption share of the corresponding country at state st becomes
8large relative to the share of a previous state where solvency constraint is not binding.
The country in constraint yields higher consumption growth toward a state in which a
solvency constraint is binding.




γ (the sum of nonlinearly





By construction, g(st+1) is one or higher. A higher g(st+1) implies that either of the two
countries face severer solvency constraints between time st and time st+1. Lustig (2007)
called g(st+1) liquidity shocks.
As demonstrated by Lustig (2007),4 thanks to a complete markets setup, a stochastic
discount factor between state s and state s′ can be deﬁned as a function of the aggregate







Without any solvency constraint (g(s′|s) = 1), a stochastic discount factor reduces






2.2.3 Asset pricing in solvency-constrained economy








holds as intertemporal eﬃciency conditions. These inequalities are often called Euler
inequalities.
The Euler inequality implies that the stochastic discount factor (βπ(st+1|st)
u′[ci(st+1)]
u′[ci(st)] ,
hereafter, SDF) of a country subject to a collateral constraint at a certain state in time






is larger), more con-
sumers face solvency constraints as a result of more volatile idiosyncratic shocks (that is, g(s
′|s)
γ is
larger). Accordingly, stochastic discount factors tend to correlated heavily negatively with dividends on
Lucas trees in a future recession state; this is a source of a larger risk premium in his model.















for a constrained country (country i) and a unconstrained country (country i′). Thus,
the SDF of a unconstrained country is larger than that of a constrained country in
equilibrium. Note that either country satisﬁes Euler equation at any state in any point
of time.
2.3 Numerical procedures
The construction of a representative agent model with time-varying Negishi weights helps
to substantially simplify the numerical computation procedure. In particular, once the
revision rule of Negishi weights is established, it is possible to compute a stochastic
discount factor between state st and state s0 (Q(s0,st)) by equation (9). Then, we
can pin down the equilibrium path of the consumption share of each country and asset
pricing without solving any individual optimization problem including optimal portfolio
problems.
Thus, the derivation of the revision rule of Negishi weights plays an essential role in
the numerical procedure. While the appendix reviews the numerical method in detail,
a key idea is conceptually simple. To begin with, we compute the consumption share
that satisﬁes a solvency constraint or equation (7) for every one-period ahead state s′
for country i, denoted by ωi(s′). If the current consumption share ωi(s) is smaller than
ωi(s′), then a solvency constraint is regarded as binding at state s′, and the Negishi
weight for a constrained country is revised upward from state s onto state s′. More
concretely, if ωi(s) < ωi(s′) at state s′ for country i, then the Negishi weight of country
i is revised upward as ζi(s′) =
[
ωi(s′)h(s′)





5In the numerical procedure described in the appendix, we use as Negishi weights ω
i(s) instead of
ζ
i(s) after all variables are standardized by the total world endowment e(zt).
102.4 Sequential trading with collateral constraints
2.4.1 Collateral constraints
This subsection presents a sequential setup. The most essential diﬀerence between a
time-0 setup and a sequential setup is that a solvency constraint or equation (3) is much




θi(st) ≥ −ai(st,st+1), ∀st+1 ∈ St+1. (12)
We call the above enforcement constraint a collateral constraint. This formulation
of solvency constraints implies that the net position of ﬁnancial portfolio consisting of
only one-period contingent bonds and Lucas trees must be nonnegative in every possible
one-period ahead state. When equation (12) is binding, a debtor country is indiﬀerent
between default with conﬁscation and full repayment at maturity. In other words, the
outstanding liability in short positions is enforceable up to the value of ﬁnancial assets
as collateral. As discussed later, a collateral constraint severely limits the borrowing
ability of each country.
If a collateral constraint or equation (12) is binding for country i, then the possessed
ﬁnancial assets are exhausted for repayment (or they are conﬁscated), and the next
period’s wealth (wi(st+1)) consists of only the labor endowment:
wi(st+1) = ei(yt+1),
otherwise, it is equal to:





Then, a sequential budget constraint is written as:
ci(st) + p(zt)θi(st) +
∑
st+1′∈St+1
q(st,st+1)ai(st,st+1) ≤ wi(st). (13)
Given the above collateral constraint (12), each country maximizes expected lifetime



















θi(st) ≥ −ai(st,st+1), ∀st+1 ∈ St+1.
A collateral constrained competitive equilibrium is deﬁned as follows. Given the
initial wealth {w1
0,w2
0}, the trading strategy {ai(st,st+1)}, {ci(st)}, {θi(st)}, the pricing
function {q(st,st+1)} and {p(zt)}, each country maximizes (14) subject to equations
(13) and (12), and market clearing conditions (1) and (2) are satisﬁed.
We make some remarks on the above type of collateral constraints. First, an insurer





θi(st)). In other words, a country can oﬀer catastrophe
insurance capacity only up to the value of Lucas trees at hand. Second, equation (12)
does not impose any upper limit on short positions in contingent claims. A country
can issue contingent bonds as long as he can repay bond obligations by Lucas trees
as collateral. Third, equation (12) does not exclude any short position in Lucas trees.
A country can make short positions as long as he carries long positions in contingent
bonds. Here, we assume that any short position is settled by cash or netting; that is,
any delivery of Lucas trees is not involved in trading short positions. In this regard,
making short positions in Lucas trees may be interpreted as issuing contingent bonds
whose repayment is proportional to the price of Lucas trees.
2.4.2 Borrowing restrictions imposed by collateral constraints
We ﬁnally point out that a collateral constraint or equation (12) is much more stringent
than a solvency constraint or equation (3) in the sense that the former extremely con-
strains the borrowing ability. It is easy to show that one country cannot borrow from the
other country in net without violating collateral constraints. The net amount ﬁnanced




























As long as a collateral constraint (12) holds, the right hand side of the above equation
cannot be positive at all. In other words, if there emerge net ﬂows of funds from one
country to the other in a time-0 setup with binding solvency constraints, then it is
impossible to restore the time-0 equilibrium outcome in a sequential manner.
2.4.3 Random errors in pricing Lucas trees
As demonstrated above, given a collateral constraint or equation (12), one country can-
not borrow a positive amount of resources from the other country. Accordingly, if there
emerges a net ﬂow of funds from country 1 (a creditor country) to country 2 (a debtor
country) at state st in the time-0 constrained equilibrium, then it is impossible to recover
the time-0 equilibrium outcome in a sequential manner.
We here introduce pricing errors associated with Lucas trees in order to relax the
extent that collateral constraints are binding in a sequential setup. More concretely, the










When ϵt satisﬁes Et−1ϵt = 0, the arbitrage condition still holds prior to time t: that











concluding section, we interpret this pricing error associated with Lucas trees as policy
13interventions in ﬁnancial markets.


















As equation (18) implies, when Lucas trees are over-evaluated (ϵt > 0), having short
positions in Lucas trees (θ2(st) < 0) may generate net positive funding with a collateral
constraints satisﬁed (−ϵtθ2(st) > 0). In this case, long positions need to be constructed
for a portfolio of one-period contingent claims; otherwise, a collateral constraint cannot
be satisﬁed.
Conversely, when Lucas trees are under-evaluated (ϵt < 0), having long positions
in Lucas trees (θ2(st) > 0) and short positions in contingent claims may generate net
positive funding with a collateral constraints satisﬁed (−ϵtθ2(st) > 0). In either case,
given a deviation from arbitrage pricing, having short positions in rich assets, which are
Lucas trees if ϵt > 0, and long positions in cheap assets, which are Lucas trees if ϵt < 0
may lead to net positive funding even if a collateral constraint is binding.
At the same time, country 1 (a creditor country) beneﬁts from the over- or under-
evaluation, because country 1 can smooth consumption over time by exploiting the
investment opportunities that are oﬀered by country 2. That is, the random pricing
errors of Lucas trees would be beneﬁcial for both countries (a debtor country and a
creditor country).
2.5 Derivation of portfolio positions in a sequential setup
In standard representative agent models, optimal portfolio problems are implicit in solv-
ing equilibrium paths, and are often considered as trivial issues. A major reason for this
is that a portfolio problem is reduced to a simple allocation of market portfolios and
non-contingent bonds when any constraint other than resource constraints is absent. As
mentioned in the previous subsection, portfolio problems are also implicit in solving our
planner’s problem. However, they are potentially important when solvency constraints
14are present, because there may emerge complicated ﬁnancial transactions between a
country damaged by catastrophic shocks and a nondamaged country.
Thanks to a two-country setup, it is possible to recover the portfolio positions of
country 1 and country 2 as follows. From the budget constraint (13), we obtain the
following system of equations to determine portfolio rules together with the market


















Note that both consumption and asset prices are standardized by the total endowment.
It is possible to identify from simulation results which state and which country faces
a solvency constraint. These identiﬁed facts simplify the above system of equations.














After simplifying the system, we approximate portfolio rules by θi(st) = νi
0+νici(st)
and ai(st,st+1) = αi
0 + αici(st). Given the simulated series of asset prices and con-
sumption shares, we identify the values of νi
0, νi, αi
0, and αi that minimize the sum
of squared residuals of the above system for a certain range of ci(st). In so doing, we
classify current states (time t states) into three possible states, including (1) neither
country 1 nor country 2 receives adverse shocks, (2) only country 1 receives shocks, and
(3) only country 2 receives shocks.
We may have a special and convenient case in which as of time t − 1, either country
would be subject to solvency constraints in any possible state of a one-period ahead
15period (time t). In this case, binding solvency constraints can identify portfolio positions
precisely, and we can obtain exact positions without using any approximation. Indeed,
the calibration results presented in Section 3 do not require using any approximation.
3 Calibration Exercises
3.1 Setup
This section explores numerically how the time-0 equilibrium outcome can be recovered
in a sequential setup when pricing errors randomly occurs in evaluating Lucas trees.
We ﬁrst determine the size of country-speciﬁc catastrophic shocks following the existing
empirical literature. Using US data for the period between 1869 and 1985, Cecchetti,
Lam, and Mark (1990) identify catastrophic shocks on GDP. In their estimation, total
annual output declines by 15.1% in the catastrophic regime, while it grows by 2.5% in the
normal regime. The normal regime moves to the catastrophic regime with probability of
1.8% per year. Once the economy enters the catastrophic state, the state repeats itself
with probability 51.0%.
On the other hand, Barro (2006) argues that the annual probability of catastrophic
states is around 1.7%, and that the loss amounts to 15% through 64% of total output
through intensively collecting data of developed and developing countries. These papers
ﬁnd that such catastrophic shocks permanently reduce the level of national output.
While catastrophic shocks may be persistent or even permanent as documented em-
pirically,6 we focus on a case with purely transitory country-speciﬁc catastrophic shocks
(i.i.d. shocks) for a computational reason. Following the above ﬁndings, we assume
that the labor endowment of a country declines by 20% with probability 1.8% per year.
Without the realization of catastrophic shocks, the labor endowment remains at a given
level. A catastrophic shock is assumed to be country-speciﬁc and uncorrelated between
the two countries.
We treat cases where solvency constraints are severely binding by making the ratio of
dividends to the world labor endowment (α) rather low. In time 0, both labor endowment
6As discussed in Gourio (2008), catastrophically damaged countries often experienced eventual
recoveries.
16and Lucas trees are equally distributed between the two countries. The rate of time
preference is 5% (β = 0.95), and the degree of relative risk aversion is ﬁve (γ = 5).
When calibration results are reported below, all variables except for portfolio posi-
tions such as ai(s,s′) and θi(s) are standardized by the total world endowment e(zt).
Thus, what is implied by ‘share’ in this section is the ratio relative to the total endow-
ment.
3.2 Purely transitory case
3.2.1 Almost perfect insurance outcomes in a time-0 setup
We ﬁrst investigate how purely transitory catastrophic shocks are shared between two
countries in the time-0 complete markets setup with solvency constraints. More con-
cretely, a country-speciﬁc catastrophic shock reduces labor endowment by 20% with
probability 1.8% per year, but without any persistence. That is, the labor endowment
share of a damaged country declines from 0.5 to 1−0.2
1+(1−0.2)(1 − α) upon the realization
of catastrophic shocks. When α is close to zero, the labor endowment share declines by
about 5.6% (= 0.5 − 1−0.2
1+(1−0.2)) due to a catastrophic event.
One of the most important observations about this case is that catastrophic shocks
are insured almost perfectly between the two countries in spite of extremely low α
(= 0.1%). Figure 1 plots the consumption share between a nondamaged country (country
1) and a damaged country (country 2); a catastrophic state takes place only in time 0.
As demonstrated by Figure 1, the consumption share of the damaged country declines
only by about 0.2% in time 0, although his labor endowment share declines by 5.6%. It
implies that the damaged country can cover 5.4% out of 5.6% losses immediately after
a catastrophic event. Even in a long term, the damaged country suﬀers from only 0.1%
permanent losses unless another catastrophic shock hits this country.
In terms of asset pricing implications, when α is 0.1%, the average equity premium
(0.994%) is much closer to the perfect insurance premium that emerges when solvency
constraints are absent (0.937%) than to the closed economy premium that emerges when
cross-border risk-sharing is absent (4.981%).
A major reason for the almost perfect insurance outcome in a time-0 setup is that
Lucas trees whose dividends are proportional to the total endowment can serve as an
17eﬀective insurance instrument.
3.2.2 Recovering the time-0 equilibrium outcome in a sequential setup
However, it is impossible to recover the above time-0 equilibrium outcome in a sequential
setup, because a large-scale net ﬂow of funds from country 1 to country 2 takes place
at a catastrophic event in a time-0 setup. As described below, collateral constraints are
so severely binding as to prevent the time-0 constrained eﬃcient outcome from being
realized in a sequential setup. Note that all asset prices are standardized by the total
endowment.
The solvency of country 1 as an insurer is crucially limited as follows. As equation
(12) implies, country 1 (insurer) can oﬀer insurance payments to country 2 (insured) only
up to (p(s0) + α)θ1(s−1) where θ1(s−1) = 0.5 in time 0. Given the time-0 equilibrium
asset pricing, (p(s0) + α) × 0.5 amounts to only 0.7% of the total world endowment.
Accordingly, the catastrophe insurance payment from country 1 to country 2 (0.7%) is
far short of the catastrophic loss borne by country 2 (5.6%). In other words, one-period
insurance contracts can cover only a part of the realized losses of country 2. It thus
follows that country 2 needs to borrow resources from country 1 in order to achieve the
time-0 equilibrium outcome in a sequential setup, but that as equation (16) implies, it
cannot at all.
From time 1 on, on the other hand, there never emerges a positive net ﬂow of funds
from one country to the other in the time-0 equilibrium outcome. Thus, except for a
catastrophic event (time 0), the time-0 equilibrium outcome can be recovered even in a
sequential setup.
A case with over-evaluation of Lucas trees As suggested in the previous section,
we introduce the random pricing error associated with Lucas trees at a catastrophic
event in order to relax the extent that collateral constraints are binding in a sequential
setup. It is assumed that a pricing error (ϵ) takes positive 10% deviation from arbitrage
pricing with probability one half and negative 10% deviation with probability one half,
when a catastrophic event takes place in time 0.
Table 1 reports the case with positive 10% deviation. In this case, Lucas trees (θi(s0))
are rich relative to one-period contingent bonds, which consist of one-period contingent
18claims (ai(s0,s1)). Thus, a damaged country (country 2) can exploit arbitrage proﬁts
and thereby cover uninsured catastrophic losses by making short positions in Lucas trees
and long positions in contingent bonds. On the other hand, a nondamaged country can
construct investment opportunities to smooth temporary relative gains over time by
making long positions in Lucas trees and short positions in contingent bonds.
More concretely, with 10% over-evaluation of Lucas trees in time 0 at a catastrophic
event, a damaged country receives 0.8% insurance payment from a nondamaged country
and 0.8% gross returns from its own investment in Lucas trees. Consequently, the uncov-
ered catastrophic loss borne by country 2 amounts to 4.0% (5.6%−0.8%−0.8%). Then,
a damaged country can ﬁnance uncovered losses up to 3.8% (out of 4.0%) by making
67.5% short positions in Lucas trees (−  p(s0)θ2(s0)), and 63.7% long positions in contin-
gent claims (
∑
s1≽s0 q(s0,s1)a2(s0,s1)). Conversely, a nondamaged country can create
investment opportunities by making 69.0% long positions in Lucas trees (  p(s0)θ1(s0)),
and 63.7% short positions in contingent bonds (−
∑
s1≽s0 q(s0,s1)a1(s0,s1)).
Let us take a look at the time-1 payoﬀ structure of Lucas trees and one-period
contingent bonds from the perspective of a damaged country (country 2). Then, we can
show that Lucas trees serve as relatively risky bonds, while contingent bonds play a role
as relatively safe bonds.
As shown in Table 2, country 2’s time-1 receipt from long positions in contingent
bonds (a2(s0,s1)) is 96.8% of the total world endowment in a case where no catastrophic
shock is realized in either country, 67.5% in a case where a catastrophic shock hits on
country 2, 66.0% in a case where a catastrophic shock hits on country 1, 42.3% in a
case where catastrophic shocks hit on both countries. On the other hand, country 2’s
time-1 payment on short positions in Lucas trees (−(p(s1) + α)θ2(s0)) is 96.8%, 66.0%,
66.0%, and 42.3% respectively. Then, contingent bonds are safe relative to Lucas trees
by the insurance eﬀect when a catastrophic event hits on country 2 in time 1; in this
state, country 2 receives a positive net payoﬀ (+1.5% = 67.5% − 66.0%).
In sum, when Lucas trees are over-evaluated at a catastrophic event, a damaged
country can eﬀectively ﬁnance uncovered losses by making short positions in rich risky
bonds (Lucas trees in this case) and long positions in cheap safe bonds (one-period
contingent bonds in this case), while a nondamaged country can construct eﬀective
19investment opportunities by making the opposite ﬁnancial positions. From the viewpoint
of a damaged country, safe bonds (one-period contingent bonds) serve as collateral assets
in issuing risky bonds (Lucas trees).
A case with under-evaluation of Lucas trees Table 3 reports the case with nega-
tive 10% deviation. In this case, Lucas trees are cheap relative to one-period contingent
bonds. Thus, a damaged country (country 2) can cover uninsured catastrophic losses
by making long positions in Lucas trees and short positions in contingent bonds. On
the other hand, by standing on the opposite side of a damaged country, a nondamaged
country can construct investment opportunities to smooth temporary relative gains over
time.
More concretely, with 10% under-evaluation of Lucas trees in time 0 at a catastrophic
event, a damaged country receives 0.7% insurance payment from a nondamaged country
and 0.7% gross returns from its own investment in Lucas trees. Consequently, the uncov-
ered catastrophic loss borne by country 2 amounts to 4.2% (5.6%−0.7%−0.7%). Then,
a damaged country can ﬁnance uncovered losses up to 4.0% (out of 4.2%) by making
26.9% long positions in Lucas trees (  p(s0)θ2(s0)), and 31.0% short positions in contin-
gent claims (−
∑
s1≽s0 q(s0,s1)a2(s0,s1)). Conversely, a nondamaged country can create
investment opportunities by making 25.7% short positions in Lucas trees (−  p(s0)θ1(s0)),
and 31.0% long positions in contingent bonds (
∑
s1≽s0 q(s0,s1)a1(s0,s1)).
In the above case, Lucas trees serve as relatively safe bonds, while one-period con-
tingent bonds play a role as relatively risky bonds. As shown in Table 4, country 2′s
time-1 payment on short positions in contingent bonds (−a2(s0,s1)) is 47.2% of the to-
tal world endowment in a case where no catastrophic shock is realized in either country,
30.7% in a case where a catastrophic shock hits on country 2, 32.2% in a case where
a catastrophic shock hits on country 1, 20.6% in a case where catastrophic shocks hit
on both countries. On the other hand, country 2′s time-1 receipt from long positions in
Lucas trees ((p(s1) + α)θ2(s0)) is 47.2%, 32.2%, 32.2%, and 20.6% respectively.
This time Lucas trees bonds are safe relative to contingent bonds by the insurance
eﬀect when a catastrophic event hits on country 2 in time 1; in this state, country 2
receives a positive net payoﬀ (+1.5% = 32.2% − 30.7%).
In sum, when Lucas trees are under-evaluated at a catastrophic event, a damaged
20country can eﬀectively ﬁnance uncovered losses by making short positions in rich risky
bonds (one-period contingent bonds in this case) and long positions in cheap safe bonds
(Lucas trees in this case), while a nondamaged country can construct eﬀective investment
opportunities by making the opposite ﬁnancial positions. Again, from the viewpoint of
a damaged country, safe bonds (Lucas trees) serve as collateral assets in issuing risky
bonds (one-period contingent bonds).
Long-run eﬀects on ﬁnancial portfolio positions There never emerges any net
ﬂow of funds from one country to the other on time 1 onward even in the time-0 equi-
librium outcome. Therefore, it is not necessary to introduce any random pricing error.
As reported in Tables 1 and 3, the large-scale short and long positions that are build up
at a catastrophic event scale down substantially in both countries from time 1 on. In
the over-evaluation case, for example, country 2’s short positions in Lucas trees reduce
drastically, while in the under-evaluation case, country 2’s long position in Lucas trees
downsize greatly.
In any case, the identical portfolio appears from time 1 onward, unless another
catastrophic event occurs. There, a nondamaged country continues to hold most of
physical Lucas trees; that is, θ(st) ≈ 1 in the long run.
3.3 Some interpretations according to Euler inequalities
By taking a look at how Euler inequalities behave in a sequential setup, it may be
easy to understand why the over- or under-evaluation of Lucas trees would help to
recover the time-0 equilibrium outcome in a sequential setup. In the time-0 equilibrium
outcome, Euler equations with respect to pricing of contingent claims hold for a solvency-
unconstrained country, but they do not for a solvency-constrained country (see equation
(11)). Hence, the following Euler inequality with respect to pricing of Lucas trees emerge
if a country is subject to solvency constraints for at least one one-period ahead future
















Then, how do Euler inequalities look like in a sequential setup with collateral con-
21straints? Without any intervention in asset pricing, the time-0 equilibrium consumption
proﬁle between time 0 and time 1 (ci(s0) and ci(s1)) cannot be achieved due to severe
collateral constraints in a sequential setup, and the resulting proﬁle between time 0 and
time 1 (  ci(s0) and   ci(s1)) deviates substantially from the time-0 equilibrium proﬁle.
Suppose that a damaged country (country 2) cannot borrow resources from country
1 by making short positions in Lucas trees at a catastrophic event (time 0). Then, given

















The above Euler inequality implies that the time-0 equilibrium return on Lucas trees is
too high for country 2 to borrow from country 1.
Suppose that a nondamaged country (country 1) cannot construct investment oppor-
tunities by making long positions in Lucas trees at a catastrophic event. Then, given the

















The above Euler inequality implies that the consumption of country 1 grows too little due
to missing investment opportunities, and that the resulting marginal rate of intertem-
poral substitution is too high for country 1. In the above case, the over-evaluation of
Lucas trees would help to mitigate the extent that Euler equations deviate from one.
In the opposite case where a damaged country cannot borrow resources by making































Then, the under-evaluation of Lucas trees would help to reduce the deviation of Euler
equations from one.
224 Conclusion
In this paper, we explore whether the eﬃcient outcome achieved by a time-0 setup with
solvency constraints can be recovered in a sequential setup with collateral constraints.
It is in general impossible to recover the time-0 constrained eﬃcient outcome in a se-
quential setup with collateral constraints, which are much more stringent than solvency
constraints. However, when pricing errors occur randomly in pricing Lucas trees during
a catastrophic event, it is possible to recover the time-0 solvency-constrained eﬃcient
outcome in a sequential manner.
More concretely, depending on the sign of pricing errors, either Lucas trees or contin-
gent bonds are relatively risky in equilibrium, and there emerge richness in risky bonds
and cheapness in safe bonds. Then, without violating collateral constraints, a damaged
country can exploit arbitrage proﬁts by making short positions in rich risky bonds and
long positions in cheap safe bonds. From the viewpoint of a damaged country, safe bonds
serve as collateral assets in issuing risky bonds. Even a nondamaged country beneﬁts
from the above ﬁnancial transactions with damaged country, because it can obtain an
investment opportunity to smooth temporary relative gains over time.
Thus, with a proper interpretation of random pricing errors associated with Lucas
trees, the time-0 solvency-constrained eﬃcient outcome may be interpreted as a realistic
sequential equilibrium with collateral constraints even when solvency constraints are
severely binding. Then, how can we interpret realistically such random pricing errors?
Which kind of market interventions may correspond to the above stochastic components?
As discussed so far, which assets are relatively risky is determined endogenously, and
risky bonds are rich relative to safe bonds. Therefore, if some agent is expected to
purchase risky bonds, which emerge endogenously, above arbitrage pricing during a
catastrophic event, then the time-0 equilibrium outcome may be achieved in a sequential
setup.
One possible candidate for such an agent may be a central bank. A central bank
is indeed expected to intervene heavily in risky bond markets during a ﬁnancial crisis.
Along some implications implied by our theoretical exercise, such active interventions in
ﬁnancial markets would trigger the creation of good collateral when it is urgently needed
in a crisis. With the above intervention, the resulting resource allocation could be more
23eﬃcient.
Appendix: The numerical computation methods
As mentioned in Section 2, it is not possible to directly solve the sequential trading
problem characterized by equation (14) because of the presence of solvency constraints.
Following Lustig (2007), we instead solve the time-0 cost minimization problem dual to
the utility maximization problem. We omit the time subscript t because the problem is
formulated in a recursive manner.
We below standardize all endogenous variables except for asset volume by the total

































[0,1]) instead of the Negishi weight ζi(st). As the Negishi weight is revised upward upon
default, the consumption share is revised upward based on a cutoﬀ rule as described
below.
There are two steps in ﬁnding the equilibrium pricing and allocation. Given the
initially guessed liquidity shocks gguess(s′|s), the ﬁrst step consists of solving the cost
minimization problem given the sequence of prices, and of deriving optimal policy func-
tions. In the second step, the sequence of consumption and asset pricing is computed
from the simulation based on the derived policy functions; it is possible to map from liq-





g(s′|s)γ, and to compute
equilibrium asset pricing. We repeat this two-step procedure until the initially guessed
liquidity shocks gguess(s′|s) coincide with the newly generated liquidity shocks gnew(s′|s).
In solving the cost minimization problem, the current history is replaced by a trun-
7Alvarez and Jermann (2000) adopt the same transformation to make endogenous variables stationary
in the case where the total endowment is growing.
24cated history zk. Here, the control variable is not current consumption, but a consump-
tion share ωi in a detrended version of the cost function (5), and it is rewritten in a
recursive manner:
ˆ C(ωi(s),s,zk) = min
ωi
[
ωi + ˆ β (s)
∑
s′∈S




where ˆ π(s′|s) and ˆ β (s) are deﬁned in equations (19) and (20). Note that ˆ π(s′|s)g(s′|s)γ
in the cost function corresponds to a stochastic discount factor or a pricing kernel; as a
result of detrending, (
e(z′)
e(z) ) is always equal to one.
Similarly, a detrended version of the present value of the endowment sequence is
written as follows:
ˆ Ce(s,zk) = ˆ ei(s) + ˆ β (s)
∑
s′∈S
ˆ π(s′|s)g(s′|s)γ ˆ Ce(s′,zh′
),
where ˆ ei(s) is the share of individual labor endowment to the aggregate endowment. Be-
cause ωi is bounded from below upon default, the lower bound of ωi or ω(s) is determined
by:
ˆ C(ω(s),s,zk) = ˆ Ce(s,zk).
Lustig (2007) ﬁnds that ωi(s′) is bounded from ω(s′) as a result of binding solvency
constraints, and constructs the following cutoﬀ rule to revise a state variable ωi upward:
that is, if ωi(s) > ω(s′), then ωi(s′) =
ωi(s)
g(s′|s), and if ωi(s) ≤ ω(s′), then ωi(s′) =
ω(s′)
g(s′|s).
Given the exogenous endowment process (s,zk), the social planner solves the above cost
minimization problem together with the cutoﬀ rule by adjusting the current consumption
share ωi(s) and the share allowed in the next period ωi(s′).
Because equation (21) is a standard dynamic programming problem, we can solve it
by a policy function iteration procedure. For this purpose, the cost function is approxi-
mated by a cubic spline interpolation with 100 grids for state ωi ∈ [0,1]. In addition, it
is assumed that k = 3 for the history parameter. It is possible to derive a policy function
ω′ = f(ω,s,zk) from the computed cost function. It is also possible to obtain the share
of consumption of the two countries from the sequence of promised consumption shares
ωi.
25In simulation, we ﬁrst generate the sequence of aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks
{st}
31,000
t=1 for 31,000 periods while omitting the initial 1000 periods. Given this gener-
ated sequence, we derive the sequence of consumption shares from the computed policy
function, and then compute asset pricing and liquidity shocks. As mentioned above, we
repeat this procedure until the generated liquidity shocks converge.
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27Table 1: Portfolio transaction behavior with one-time shock (shock size: 20%, α=0.1%,
+10% deviation from arbitrage equity prices)
labor endow- realized insurance consump- invested invested invested











time -1 0.500 0.011 0.000 0.500 0.500 0.010 0.000
time 0 0.556 0.008 -0.008 0.502 46.360 0.690 -0.637
time 1 0.500 0.989 -0.968 0.502 1.620 0.033 -0.014
time 2 0.500 0.034 -0.013 0.501 1.290 0.026 -0.007
time 3 0.500 0.027 -0.006 0.501 1.130 0.023 -0.004
time 4 0.500 0.024 -0.003 0.501 1.050 0.021 -0.002
time 5 0.500 0.022 -0.001 0.501 1.010 0.020 -0.001
time 6 0.500 0.021 0.000 0.501 0.990 0.020 -0.001
time 7 0.500 0.021 0.000 0.501 0.980 0.020 0.000
time 8 0.500 0.021 0.000 0.501 0.980 0.020 0.000
time 9 0.500 0.021 0.000 0.501 0.970 0.020 0.000
time 10 0.500 0.021 0.001 0.501 0.970 0.020 0.000
time 11 0.500 0.021 0.001 0.501 0.970 0.020 0.000
damaged country
time -1 0.500 0.011 0.000 0.500 0.500 0.010 0.000
time 0 0.444 0.008 0.008 0.498 -45.360 -0.675 0.637
time 1 0.500 -0.968 0.968 0.498 -0.620 -0.013 0.014
time 2 0.500 -0.013 0.013 0.499 -0.290 -0.006 0.007
time 3 0.500 -0.006 0.006 0.499 -0.130 -0.003 0.004
time 4 0.500 -0.003 0.003 0.499 -0.050 -0.001 0.002
time 5 0.500 -0.001 0.001 0.499 -0.010 0.000 0.001
time 6 0.500 0.000 0.000 0.499 0.010 0.000 0.001
time 7 0.500 0.000 0.000 0.499 0.020 0.000 0.000
time 8 0.500 0.000 0.000 0.499 0.020 0.000 0.000
time 9 0.500 0.000 0.000 0.499 0.030 0.001 0.000
time 10 0.500 0.001 -0.001 0.499 0.030 0.001 0.000
time 11 0.500 0.001 -0.001 0.499 0.030 0.001 0.000
Note: All variables except for the number of labor endowment share and invested Lucas trees (θ
i)
represent the ratio relative to the total world endowment. The labor endowment share in the second
column represents the ratio relative to the total labor endowment.
28Table 2: Receipts from or repayments on contingent contracts at maturity with one-time
shock (shock size: 20%, α=0.1%, +10% deviation from arbitrage equity prices)
shares of no catastrophic catastrophic shock catastrophic shock catastrophic shock













time 0 0.500 0.000 0.007 -0.007 0.000
time 1 46.360 -0.968 -0.660 -0.675 -0.423
time 2 1.620 -0.013 -0.009 -0.024 -0.006
time 3 1.290 -0.006 -0.004 -0.019 -0.003
time 4 1.130 -0.003 -0.002 -0.016 -0.001
time 5 1.050 -0.001 -0.001 -0.015 0.000
time 6 1.010 0.000 0.000 -0.015 0.000
time 7 0.990 0.000 0.000 -0.014 0.000
time 8 0.980 0.000 0.000 -0.014 0.000
time 9 0.980 0.000 0.000 -0.014 0.000
time 10 0.970 0.001 0.000 -0.014 0.000
time 11 0.970 0.001 0.000 -0.014 0.000
time 12 0.970 0.001 0.000 -0.014 0.000
damaged country
time 0 0.500 0.000 -0.007 0.007 0.000
time 1 -45.360 0.968 0.660 0.675 0.423
time 2 -0.620 0.013 0.009 0.024 0.006
time 3 -0.290 0.006 0.004 0.019 0.003
time 4 -0.130 0.003 0.002 0.016 0.001
time 5 -0.050 0.001 0.001 0.015 0.000
time 6 -0.010 0.000 0.000 0.015 0.000
time 7 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.000
time 8 0.020 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.000
time 9 0.020 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.000
time 10 0.030 -0.001 0.000 0.014 0.000
time 11 0.030 -0.001 0.000 0.014 0.000
time 12 0.030 -0.001 0.000 0.014 0.000
Note: a
i(s
−1,s) is standardized by the total world endowment.
29Table 3: Portfolio transaction behavior with one-time shock (shock size: 20%, α=0.1%,
−10% deviation from arbitrage equity prices)
labor endow- realized insurance consump- invested invested invested











time -1 0.500 0.011 0.000 0.500 0.500 0.010 0.000
time 0 0.556 0.007 -0.007 0.502 -21.100 -0.257 0.310
time 1 0.500 -0.450 0.472 0.502 1.620 0.033 -0.014
time 2 0.500 0.034 -0.013 0.501 1.290 0.026 -0.007
time 3 0.500 0.027 -0.006 0.501 1.130 0.023 -0.004
time 4 0.500 0.024 -0.003 0.501 1.050 0.021 -0.002
time 5 0.500 0.022 -0.001 0.501 1.010 0.020 -0.001
time 6 0.500 0.021 0.000 0.501 0.990 0.020 -0.001
time 7 0.500 0.021 0.000 0.501 0.980 0.020 0.000
time 8 0.500 0.021 0.000 0.501 0.980 0.020 0.000
time 9 0.500 0.021 0.000 0.501 0.970 0.020 0.000
time 10 0.500 0.021 0.001 0.501 0.970 0.020 0.000
time 11 0.500 0.021 0.001 0.501 0.970 0.020 0.000
damaged country
time -1 0.500 0.011 0.000 0.500 0.500 0.010 0.000
time 0 0.444 0.007 0.007 0.498 22.100 0.269 -0.310
time 1 0.500 -0.968 0.968 0.498 -0.620 -0.013 0.014
time 2 0.500 -0.013 0.013 0.499 -0.290 -0.006 0.007
time 3 0.500 -0.006 0.006 0.499 -0.130 -0.003 0.004
time 4 0.500 -0.003 0.003 0.499 -0.050 -0.001 0.002
time 5 0.500 -0.001 0.001 0.499 -0.010 0.000 0.001
time 6 0.500 0.000 0.000 0.499 0.010 0.000 0.001
time 7 0.500 0.000 0.000 0.499 0.020 0.000 0.000
time 8 0.500 0.000 0.000 0.499 0.020 0.000 0.000
time 9 0.500 0.000 0.000 0.499 0.030 0.001 0.000
time 10 0.500 0.001 -0.001 0.499 0.030 0.001 0.000
time 11 0.500 0.001 -0.001 0.499 0.030 0.001 0.000
Note: All variables except for the number of labor endowment share and invested Lucas trees (θ
i)
represent the ratio relative to the total world endowment. The labor endowment share in the second
column represents the ratio relative to the total labor endowment.
30Table 4: Receipts from or repayments on contingent contracts at maturity with one-time
shock (shock size: 20%, α=0.1%, −10% deviation from arbitrage equity prices)
shares of no catastrophic catastrophic shock catastrophic shock catastrophic shock













time 0 0.500 0.000 0.007 -0.007 0.000
time 1 -21.100 0.472 0.322 0.307 0.206
time 2 1.620 -0.013 -0.009 -0.024 -0.006
time 3 1.290 -0.006 -0.004 -0.019 -0.003
time 4 1.130 -0.003 -0.002 -0.016 -0.001
time 5 1.050 -0.001 -0.001 -0.015 0.000
time 6 1.010 0.000 0.000 -0.015 0.000
time 7 0.990 0.000 0.000 -0.014 0.000
time 8 0.980 0.000 0.000 -0.014 0.000
time 9 0.980 0.000 0.000 -0.014 0.000
time 10 0.970 0.001 0.000 -0.014 0.000
time 11 0.970 0.001 0.000 -0.014 0.000
time 12 0.970 0.001 0.000 -0.014 0.000
damaged country
time 0 0.500 0.000 -0.007 0.007 0.000
time 1 22.100 -0.472 -0.322 -0.307 -0.206
time 2 -0.620 0.013 0.009 0.024 0.006
time 3 -0.290 0.006 0.004 0.019 0.003
time 4 -0.130 0.003 0.002 0.016 0.001
time 5 -0.050 0.001 0.001 0.015 0.000
time 6 -0.010 0.000 0.000 0.015 0.000
time 7 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.000
time 8 0.020 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.000
time 9 0.020 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.000
time 10 0.030 -0.001 0.000 0.014 0.000
time 11 0.030 -0.001 0.000 0.014 0.000
time 11 0.030 -0.001 0.000 0.014 0.000
Note: a
i(s
−1,s) is standardized by the total world endowment.
31Figure 1: Consumption shares with one-time shock (shock size: 20%, α=0.1%)
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